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Abstract 
 
The labour performance of migrants has been largely assumed to vary with individuals’ 
reasons to migrate. Accordingly, migrants who migrate to join their relatives at 
destination are commonly expected to be negatively selected in terms of their labour 
characteristics. However, family and economic reasons for migration are not mutually 
exclusive but often complementary, especially among women. In addition, there exists a 
large variation in the post-migration employment rates of the so-called ‘family 
migrants’. In this article, I argue that the temporal sequence of migration and key family 
life-cycle events may help us in explaining the post-migration employment patterns of 
migrants, especially that of females. To test this hypothesis I first construct a 
comprehensive typology that classifies all immigrants according to the timing of 
marriage and migration for each spouse, and their immigrant or native origin. Next, I 
examine the explanatory power of this typology by estimating the employment 
probability of of migrants in multivariate logit regressions that include the resulting 
types of ‘family migrants’ as independent. Our results confirm the theoretical and 
empirical utility of studying marriage and migration jointly in order to explain 
differences in the labour performance of immigrant women. Moreover, our main 
conclusions concerning cross-types differences in female labour behaviour remain valid 
ever after controlling for current legal status and legal status at entry, and running 
separate analyses for the main origin groups in Spain. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Contemporary societies are becoming multi-ethnic at a very fast pace as a result of the 
recent growth in international migration trends. This introduces new sources of socio-
economic heterogeneity in receiving societies related to the distinctiveness of immigrant 
households. Generally speaking immigrants fare comparatively poorly on many 
economic indicators such as relative incomes, poverty, employment, etc., which feed the 
public concerns about the potential social exclusion of immigrant families and the 
ethnification of inequality in receiving countries. Low employment rates of immigrant 
women constitute a major concern in this regard, given the crucial role of female 
incomes in avoiding household poverty, especially in contexts where two-earner 
households are becoming the norm. However, our understanding of the main 
determinants of the labour performance of immigrant women remains quite limited, and 
often dominated by stereotypical views that equate female migration with economically 
inactive family dependants.  
 
In this article, I challenge this view using empirical evidence from recent international 
migration to Spain. First, I illustrate the existence of great heterogeneity in both reasons 
to migrate and employment trajectories among immigrant women. Secondly, I try to 
account for such heterogeneity analyzing migration and family trajectories jointly. The 
rest of the article is organized as follows. In Section 2 I review previous research 
dealing with the main issues of interest for this article, and describe the characteristics 
of recent international migration to Spain and the main features of the Spanish visa and 
residence system in Section 3. Next, in Section 4, I formulate the main hypotheses to be 
tested, and present the data in Section 5. Finally, I estimate and discuss the results in 
Section 6 and conclude in Section 7. 
 
2. Previous research about family-linked migration and economic integration 
outcomes 
 
Much of the empirical research concerned with the impact of family migration on the 
labour performance of women has focused on internal rather than international 
migration., According to the family migration model inspired in the human capital 
theory (Sandell 1977, Taylor 1978), women are expected to experience smaller returns 
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to migration than their husbands due to their usually discontinuous attachment to the 
labour force, and also to suffer from higher unemployment and lower participation rates 
immediately after migration because of “the higher value that the family attaches to her 
market time in order to set up the new household at destination” (Sandell, 1977: 407).  
 
Most empirical research has supported, up to date, this disruption hypothesis as 
regarding the effects of family internal migration on the labour market performance of 
wives. In contrast, the employment-related consequences of migration for women have 
been far less explored in the context of international migration
1
. Yet, this has not 
prevented from a generalized and stereotypical view of international immigrant women 
as ‘tied-movers’ who will not work at destination in most of the specialized literature2. 
The assumption that women’s migration is linked to family rather than economic 
motives, the inherent difficulties in studying female labour behaviour (career 
interruptions, family-life cycle factors, occupational sex-segregation, etc.) and the lack 
of adequate datasets help explaining the little evidence available in this area. 
 
However, there exist some studies that actually support a negative view of family 
migrants as having harmful effects on the host economy. In the US, class of admission 
remains a significant correlate of immigrant labour performance, in terms of 
occupational attainment and earnings. Even after controlling for observable human 
capital characteristics and region of origin, employment-preference immigrants are able 
to keep higher prestige scores than both refugees and family-based immigrants (Akresh 
2006), despite of the substantial occupational upgrading experienced by the latter that 
could serve to erase cross-group differences after 12 to 18 years in the country (Jasso 
and Rosenweizg 1997; Duleep and Regets 1996). In Europe, Constant and Zimmermann 
(2006) have also concluded that there are long-lasting effects of the category of 
admission on the employment choices and earnings potential of immigrants in 
Germany, especially for immigrants admitted on the basis of asylum but also for those 
entering for family reunification. If family migrants work little and earn less than 
economic migrants, an increase in family reunification flows is expected to increase the 
                                                 
1
 The ‘Family Investment Hypothesis’  (Long 1980) constitutes one of the few exceptions in this regard, 
but its reasoning only applies to women who migrated at the same time or immediately after their 
husbands (see AUTHOR A 2006a). 
2
 Tied-movers in family migration decisions are those who participate in moves that result in a loss for 
themselves but their loss is exceeded by the family gain.. 
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number of non-working people in immigrant households and, thus, the economic 
dependency ratio among the immigrant population 
 
This evidence has contributed to reinforce the image of family migration as contrary to 
economic migration and of a type that is potentially harmful for the host economy. 
However, at least three major limitations may seriously challenge the conclusions of 
these studies. First of all, they all measure the impact of the admission category on the 
labour market performance of immigrants; thus, their results are hardly surprising since 
they probably reflect the common barriers that immigration policies generally impose 
on migrants admitted on non-employment grounds, rather than unobserved 
characteristics of family immigrants that correlate with their labour performance. In 
addition, immigrants admitted on the basis of their family ties with other residents do 
not exhaust family-linked migration but just the narrowest legal version of it. Much 
irregular migration is often made of family migrants (see Massey 2003, Cornelius et al. 
2008 for the US, and AUTHOR A 2008, 2010 for Spain). Accordingly, a 
comprehensive assessment of the labour performance of family migrants and, more 
generally, of the links between family reasons to migrate and migrants’ economic 
performance at destination should include also them. 
 
Secondly, none of these studies included information on current legal status jointly with 
the category of admission, and undocumented migrants were systematically excluded 
from the analyses, which may lead to radically misleading conclusions about the 
efficacy of immigration policy in their role of selecting migrants, and about the actual 
trends and determinants of immigrants’ economic incorporation in their host societies 
(Massey and Bartley 2006: 472). 
  
Thirdly, and more important, these studies have largely restricted to men’s experiences, 
while it is well-known that women largely outnumber men in family-related migration 
categories. In fact, many studies have proved that migration decisions are gendered 
(Zlotnik 1995a, 1995b, Massey et al. 1987, Stier and Tienda 1992, Kanaiaupuni 1995, 
Donato and Kanaiaupuni 2000, Parrado 2004); moreover, some studies provide 
premilinary evidence that gender differences go beyond the migration decision and also 
emerge in the post-migration labour behaviour patterns of men and women. For 
instance, having a native partner (Baker and Benjamin 1997, Meng and Gregory 2005) 
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or being single at the time of arrival (Duleep and Regets 1993, Cerruti and Massey 
2001) are found to increase the employment chances (and/or wages) of immigrant 
women, but these same factors are not equally relevant to explain the labour 
performance of immigrant men. Moreover, some authors have also found significant 
differences between different types of female family migrants, like reunified wives –for 
whom marriage pre-existed the migration of both spouses-, and imported wives –who 
had not yet married/met their husband at the time he migrated- with regard to their 
educational levels and investments in education, their household living arrangements 
and also their labour performance at destination (Nielsen et al. 2007, AUTHOR A 
2006b). 
 
However, we still lack a comprehensive analysis of the joint effect of marriage, marital 
status at migration and relative timing of migration within the couple, and their potential 
effect on migrants’ post-migration behaviour (see Hondegnau-Sotelo 1994 and 
AUTHOR A 2006a for exceptions). Even more, we know very little about how 
immigration regulations and labour market policies interact with these family life-cycle 
events in shaping the labour behaviour of immigrants, which seems particularly crucial 
in contexts like the Spanish one, where some flows are highly feminized, a strong 
demand for cheap labour in women’s occupations exists, and immigration policies have 
not effectively discouraged undocumented residence and activity in the black economy. 
 
3. International migration to Spain and its regulation 
 
Spanish immigration experience has called the attention of many scholars and policy-
makers because of its sharp increase in a very short time; but also because of the large 
amount of undocumented immigrants who have periodically been regularised. The 
difference between the number of foreigners in the Municipal Population Register 
(which does not require to demonstrate legal status) and the number of valid residence 
permits in the same year, some authors estimated that the percentage of foreigners living 
in Spain without the proper residence permit could represent up to the 70 percent of the 
total foreign population in 2002, 40 percent in 2005 and 24 percent in 2007 (AUTHOR 
B and AUTHOR A 2007). 
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The reasons for this situation, in which irregularity has become a structural feature of 
the Spanish immigration system, are mainly two: the absence of efficient and reliable 
doors of legal-entry, on the one hand, and the soft enforcement of both external and 
internal controls
3
. Legal admissions based on employers’ official recruitment of foreign 
workers have traditionally represented a ridiculous share of total annual entries
4
, and 
other legal channels to enter the country like family reunification or asylum were for a 
long time either completely closed or very costly to follow. Namely, the administrative 
procedure to sponsor the legal immigration of immediate family members has been 
messy and extremely time-consuming until very recently, despite of the relatively soft 
legal requirements imposed by Spain in comparison to other countries like Denmark or 
the Netherlands. Even if the application for family reunification is accepted in Spain, it 
will still take a long time until reunification materializes because the sponsored relatives 
need to obtain a visa in their country of origin, which is the most uncertain and 
complicated step of the entire process (see more in AUTHOR A 2010). 
 
The lack of a reasonably timely family reunification option within the legal system has 
probably contributed to the breakdown of the Spanish immigration system, which was 
fragile to begin with (see Hatch 2006 for a similar argument in the US). As can be seen 
in Figure 1, the number of non-EU foreigners living in Spain increased from about 1 
million in 2000 to 3.5 million in 2006. Most newcomers entered the country legally as 
tourists but became irregular immigrants when their visas expired and they overstayed 
(see the difference between the line with squares and the line with crosses). On the other 
hand, the number of residence permits granted for the purpose of family reunification 
over the entire period amounted only to 420,000. It can be easily argued then that 
statistics of permits granted for the purpose of family reunification clearly under-
estimate the actual size of family-linked migration to Spain, and that a sizable 
proportion of the migrants who joined their relatives in Spain did so with following the 
legal procedure for family reunification.  
 
------ Insert Figure 1 here ------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
                                                 
3
 Brochmann and Hammar (1999) utilised this terminology to distinguish measures of immigration 
control implemented at the border (external) and within the territory (internal). 
4
 Approximately 3 percent of total entries (legal and irregular ones) during the period 2002-2007 
(CeiMigra 2008: 7). 
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Actually, foreign spouses who are willing to come to Spain have strong incentives to 
enter the country on tourist visas and overstay illegally, especially if they are interested 
in working in Spain. First of all, this route into Spain would allow them to join their 
spouses much sooner than the legal procedure of family reunification. Secondly, the 
labour status of spouses that overstay their tourist visas and that of legally reunified 
spouses is not very different upon arrival, since the latter cannot apply for a work permit 
until having resided in Spain for one year. Thirdly, and maybe the most important, the 
risks associated with an undocumented status in Spain have been substantially lower 
than in other EU countries. On the one hand, as we mentioned earlier, the enforcement 
of internal immigration controls has been traditionally soft in Spain, although 
undocumented foreigners are probably more fearful of expulsion now that they used to 
be three or five years ago
5
. In addition, the implementation of regularisation programs 
has been a common policy instrument during the last decade –since 2000 more than 
1,300,000 foreigners have obtained residence permits through this type of process- 
which have definitely enhanced the incentives to overstay (De Bruycker 2000; 
AUTHOR B and AUTHOR A 2008; Baldwin-Edwards and Kraler 2009).  
 
Given such a perverse set of incentives, it is not impossible to think that migrants who 
decided to utilise the slow and burdensome legal procedure for family reunification to 
come to Spain not only had a stronger aversion to break the law, but probably also a 
weaker preference for work. Moreover, the odds of becoming an irregular resident at 
some point in time have kept high due to both the precarious employment conditions of 
most migrants in Spain, and the link between employment and legal residency 
established in the Spanish foreigners’ law. As result, entries and exits from the group of 
‘legal’ residents have been common due to the short expiration period of most 
temporary residence permits granted during the multiple regularisation processes. For 
all these reasons, legal status at entry is expected to be negatively related with 
employment among immigrant women in Spain, once their current legal status is 
accounted for
6
. 
 
                                                 
5
 Expulsions effectively increased from approximately 1.3 percent of the estimated number of non-EU 
undocumented foreigners residing in Spain in 2003 to 2.5 in 2007. However, regardless of actual figures 
(which are quite low, in any case), the immigration and economic context has recently changed towards 
an increasing perception of undocumented status as a risky situation.  
6
 As one anonymous reviewer noticed, this reasoning probably does not apply to high-skilled migrants. 
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4. Hypotheses 
 
Bearing in mind the reviewed findings in the previous literature and the particular 
characteristics of the Spanish immigration and labour market context, we can formulate 
the following hypotheses: 
 
H1. Different types of family-linked migration are expected to be associated not only 
with systematic differences in (declared) reasons to migrate but also to systematic 
differences in post-migration labour performance, even after controlling for variation in 
reasons to migrate. 
H1a. Namely, on the basis of previous findings and the varying degrees to which 
different sequences in the ordering of marriage and spouses’ migration are expected to 
reveal either individual or household strategies, we expect the following ranking in the 
employment probability of female migrants (from most likely to least likely to be 
employed): single, single at migration but currently married (to an imported husband, to 
another immigrant, to a native), married at migration who preceded their husbands, 
married at migration who migrated jointly with their husbands, reunified wives and, 
finally, imported spouses
7
 
H2. Increasing stability concerning legal status is expected to be associated with 
increasing employment probability of (female) migrants. 
H3. However, we expect differences in employment across family-migration types to 
remain even after controlling for current legal status, given the extent of the informal 
economy in Spain, on the one hand, and the traditionally blurred frontier between 
regular and irregular status, which has affected all types of migrants. 
H4. Finally, given the pervasive set of incentives created by the soft enforcement of 
norms against irregular migration, the existence of a strong demand for cheap labour in 
female occupations, the presence of a large informal economy and the slow and 
restrictive regime for family reunification of spouses, we expect ‘followers’ who 
utilized their family ties to be legally admitted to Spain to perform worse than those 
who just joined their relatives “de facto”. 
 
 
                                                 
7
 Difference between reunified and imported spouses…..  
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5. Data and method 
 
The National Immigrants Survey (NIS) is a representative survey that collects 
information about the migration and settlement experience of nearly 15,500 foreign-
born people, aged 16 or more and who lived in Spain in 2007, regardless of their legal 
status
8
. Apart from its large sample size and representativeness, NIS has the advantage 
of including also a considerable amount of retrospective information on the 
interviewees and their closest relatives. By using this information it is possible a partial 
reconstruction of their migration, family, labour and legal trajectories that allow testing 
the hypotheses formulated in Section 4.  
 
In the following section, I will examine the employment performance of immigrants in 
Spain by means of multivariate logistic regression, in which the dependent variable is 
‘being employed’ (or not) at the time of the survey. I eliminated from the total sample 
individuals born in EU countries -because general immigration law do not apply to 
them; in addition, immigrants who arrived at age younger than 16 (the so-called 1.5 
generation) were also excluded since they did not make their own migration decisions; 
finally, immigrants older than 55 at the time of the survey were also eliminated. The 
final sample size is 9,010 individuals, of which 4,122 are males and 4,888 females. 
 
The multivariate analyses focus on the effects of the indicators for reasons to migrate, 
family-linked migration type, current legal status and legal status at entry, which are 
described in more detail in the following paragraphs. However, all the models included 
also the following controls: age at migration, years since migration, highest educational 
level attained, country of birth (Morocco, Romania, Ecuador, Colombia, Others), 
whether the immigrant had working experience before migrating to Spain or not, 
Spanish-language skills, whether the migrant had a work proposal before coming to 
Spain or not, and the number of children the migrant had at the time of the survey
9
. The 
discussion of the results restricts to immigrant women, but the results for men are also 
shown for the sake of comparison. 
                                                 
8
 Questionnaires were available in French, English, German, Romanian and Arab, apart from Spanish, 
which was the language mostly used during the interviews. .Complete documentation, including the 
different versions of the questionnaire, and microdata are freely available at 
http://www.ine.es/jaxi/menu.do?type=pcaxisandpath=%2Ft20%2Fp319andfile=inebaseandL= 
9
 Available on request. 
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In order to test the main hypotheses formulated above, I constructed a comprehensive 
typology that combines information on the nativity of the husband, the ordering of 
marriage and each spouse’s migration to Spain (i.e. marriage before, after or at the same 
time at migration), and the sequence of both spouses’ migration (i.e. who goes first or 
who follows whom). This typology has the enormous advantage of combining at once 
the three main factors the literature has paid attention to in order to explain the labour 
behaviour of immigrant women. Table 1 summarizes the resulting categories, their 
definition and the distribution of our sample according to them, by gender. 
 
------------------ Insert Table 1 here ---------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
As can be seen, approximately 35 percent of women in our sample had not married yet 
at the time of the survey; 17 percent were not married at arrival but married someone 
during their stay in Spain: 7 percent married another immigrant in Spain, 8 percent 
married a native in Spain, and 2 percent married someone in their country of origin 
(potential importer and importer). On the other hand, approximately 34 percent of the 
female sample were already married at the time of their arrival to Spain: 13 percent 
came the same year as their husband, 5 percent came earlier (potential reunifier and 
reunifier), and 11 came after (of which, 3 percent by native husbands), and 5 percent 
were ‘imported’ by men of their same origin in Spain. It appears clear from the table 
that both ‘reunified spouses’ and ‘imported spouses’ are mostly a female phenomenon. 
 
Apart from the described typology, we have also constructed three additional indicators 
aimed at measuring our main explanatory variables:  
a) The individual’s reasons to migrate. This variable has been constructed from the 
interviewees’ answers to the question ‘Why did you migrate to Spain?’, which admitted 
multiple responses. Individuals are classified in four categories depending on whether 
they mentioned only economic reasons, only family-related reasons, a combination of 
both, or others. As can be seen in Table 2, economic reasons dominate among both men 
(58 percent) and also women (45 percent). Moreover, as we expected the proportion of 
women who mentioned both economic and family reasons as motives for their 
migration is larger than among men (12 versus 8 percent, respectively). Moreover, 
reunified wives –the traditional archetype of economically dependent family migrant- is 
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the group for which the concurrence of economic and family reasons is most common 
(33 percent), followed by women who migrated jointly with their spouses (17 percent). 
In fact, only 47 percent of reunified wives declared to have migrated exclusively 
because of family reasons. In fact, 44 percent of these reunified women said they had 
never worked at their country of origin but were working in Spain at the time of the 
survey, which does not fit with the idea of ‘tied-movers’. In contrast, also as we 
expected, imported wives the most strongly family-oriented group of migrant women in 
our sample (77 percent declared only family reasons to migrate). 
 
-------- Insert Table 2 here ----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
b) The legal status of each individual at the time of the survey. Approximately 19 
percent of our total sample of non-EU female migrants lacked of proper residency 
documents in Spain at the time of the survey, 40 percent had been granted a temporary 
residence permit, 16 percent had a permanent residence permit and approximately 7 
percent enjoyed the privileged EU regime because of their family ties with an EU 
citizen, despite of being third-country nationals. Finally,14 percent had already acquired 
the Spanish nationality and, therefore, were not subjected to the foreigners’ law 
anymore. The corresponding percentages for men are quite similar (see Table 3). 
 
c) Whether the individual entered Spain legally or not (individuals who probably held a 
tourist visa at the time of entering the country but nothing else are classified as illegal 
entry). NIS did not collect any direct information on category of admission or legal 
status at entry, but only a semi-retrospective question asking for how long the 
interviewee has been in the current legal status. By combining this information, 
responses to other items in the questionnaire (date of arrival, date of arrival of closest 
relatives to Spain, date of marriage, nationality and country of birth of the spouse, etc.), 
and information on the rules governing the Spanish system of residence permits, I was 
able to indirectly reconstruct the legal status at entry of approximately half of our 
sample. Individuals whose legal status at entry could not be reconstructed from the 
survey information will remain in the estimated models as ‘missing’ (see Table 3).  
 
------------ Insert Table 3 here --------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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6. Results and discussion 
 
In Table 4, results from Model 1 to Model 3 confirm that the temporal order between 
one’s own migration, marriage and the spouse’s migration is a relevant factor in 
explaining women’s post-migration employment, but not that of their male counterparts: 
none of the categories within the family-migration typology has a statistically 
significant effect on men’s employment probability, while almost all of them are 
significant for women (compare models 1 to 3 for females in Table 4, with the last 
column in Table 4 for males). In other words, our results confirm that the determinants 
of female labour performance at destination are much more complex and heterogeneous 
than in the case of men. And in the framework of this larger complexity, the sequence of 
key family life-cycle events like marriage, the woman’s own migration and that of her 
husband appears to have long-lasting effects on female post-migration labour behaviour. 
. 
 
------ Insert Table 4 here ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
With regard to the internal heterogeneity of the female immigrant population 
concerning their employment performance, we also observe some interesting results in 
Model 1. First of all, single women (i.e. ‘not married yet’) are not the group most likely 
to be employed, as suggested by some previous studies.  In contrast, the highest 
employment probability appears among women who are already married but preceded 
their husbands in their migration to Spain (‘potential reunifiers’, ‘importers’ and 
‘reunifiers’, in this order). Obviously, these are quite ‘selective’ women, especially the 
potential reunifiers, since they were married before migration but left their husband 
behind and have not yet brought them to Spain (both the reunifiers and the importers 
have already joined with their husbands in Spain, although they also preceded them in 
migration). Taking into account the generally more traditional gender roles and gender 
ideologies in most of their countries of origin, in comparison to Spain, it seems quite 
clear that they are a very selected group (in fact, they represent only approximately 6 
percent of the non-EU female sample). On the other hand, it is very likely these women 
made their migration decision after being informed by some other female migrants 
about the economic opportunities available for them in the Spanish labour market, as 
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the results regarding their reasons to migrate suggested (see Table 2). On the other hand, 
the fact that immigrant women who are still single (35 percent the female sample) are 
less likely to be employed than the pioneer wives might be related not only to the strong 
selectivity involved in the migration of the latter, but also to the higher reservation wage 
that may derive from more years of education and less family responsibilities among the 
single ones. A proper test of this explanation would require from longitudinal data that 
allows for a more complete analysis of the complete work trajectories and occupational 
mobility of different types of immigrant women. 
  
Secondly, what is most important for the main argument here,  the coefficient for 
‘reunified’ wives is also positive (see Model 1). As I mentioned in Section 2, this type 
of migrants have been traditionally identified as the typical ‘family-migrant’ who is 
expected to be inactive and economically dependent and, therefore, the basis of much of 
the negative view that have accompanied family reunification processes in receiving 
countries. However, our results suggest that these women are not necessarily inactive in 
the host labour market; in fact, in Spain, reunified wives seem to have a higher 
employment probability than female migrants who came single and married another 
immigrant during their stay in Spain (reference category), but also than women who 
have mix-married in Spain or who have not married yet
10
. In contrast, it is the group of 
‘imported wives’, as expected, the only one that fits the traditional image of the 
dependant reunified wife. 
 
Jointly, these findings confirm our hypothesis about the crucial role that pre-migration 
family status plays in shaping the labour behaviour of immigrant women in destination 
countries. In particular, these findings are consistent with the argument that it is extent 
to which women were able to participate in their husbands’ migration decision as part of 
their household economic strategy, and not only whether they migrated before or after 
their husbands, the most crucial factor in predicting the employment patterns of female 
migrants at destination. Note that this is precisely the main difference between reunified 
and imported wives: both types of female family migrants migrated after their husbands, 
but the imported ones where not yet married to their husband – sometimes, they had not 
even met him- at the time he migrated. 
                                                 
10
 Differences between reunified wives and these three groups are all significant at 95 percent level, as we 
tested by changing the reference category and re-estimating the models. 
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Next,  I tested the robustness of our previous findings once that both current legal status 
and legal status at entry are controlled for in Models 2 and 3, respectively, since 
different migration trajectories might be systematically associated with different legal 
status.  
 
In Model 2, we observe that women with a temporary residence permit (which does not 
imply necessarily a work permit) are the only group of female migrants with a slightly 
higher employment probability than the undocumented ones (see coefficient B = 0.29). 
However, and surprisingly, neither women with a permanent permit, with an EU family 
card or naturalised immigrants, who clearly have stronger legal status than the rest, have 
higher employment probabilities than undocumented ones (see non significant 
coefficients for all these categories in Model 2). In fact, even if a temporary residence 
permit provides migrants with legal status, this is a quite precarious one since temporary 
permits –as I explained in Section 3- need to be renewed every one or two years, and in 
most cases renewal is dependent on being able to prove legal employment. Two 
different, and maybe complementary, explanations help understanding these results. 
First, the vulnerable status of undocumented but also temporary female workers 
(subjected to periodical renewals of their permits) is what probably makes them 
particularly attractive for employers in search for cheap female labour. Secondly, it is 
possible that the higher probability of employment of women with temporary permits 
simply reflects lower reservation wage of women who hold the intention to return, in 
comparison to women with intentions to stay more permanently (see Dustman, 1997 for 
a similar argument). In any case, it seems important to highlight that controlling for 
current legal status does not change the effect of family-migration categories found in 
Model 1 (compare Model 1 and 2), which suggests that there is no systematic 
association between the family-migration sequence followed by female migrants and 
their current legal status. 
 
Finally, in Model 3 we tested our hypothesis about the negative association between 
legal entry to Spain and employment among immigrant women, as a result of the 
perverse set of incentives induced by the labour market structure and the soft 
enforcement of the Spanish immigration law. The obtained results confirm that women 
who entered Spain as legal migrants are less likely to employed in Spain than those who 
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entered irregularly (see the large negative coefficient of ‘legal entry’ in Model 3). 
However, these results must be taken with caution since women with missing 
information in this variable also appear as less likely to work than the reference 
category (‘irregular entry’). In any case, the results concerning the effects of the family-
migration typology remain, once again, virtually unchanged after adding this new 
control; in contrast, the coefficient for ‘permanent residence permit’ and ‘naturalised’ 
become positive and significant (see Model 3), as we originally expected. In other 
words, if the negative effect of legal status at entry were not controlled for (as in Model 
2), the positive effect of stronger legal status at the time of the survey on female 
immigrants’ employment is wrongly underestimated. 
 
So far, the obtained results largely confirm the hypotheses formulated in Section 4. 
However, it can be argued that these results may obscure large internal differences 
among migrants coming from different origin countries where the intensity of male 
labour migration, gender ideologies and the rate of female labour participation greatly 
vary. In fact, some family-migration trajectories are much more common among 
particular origin groups than among others. For instance, it might be that the negative 
effect of being an imported wife on employment found in Table 4 largely reflects the 
predominance of Moroccans in this category (see Table 5), as Moroccan women are, on 
average, less likely to be employed than the rest.  
 
In order to examine the extent to which our findings can be generalize to immigrant 
women as a whole, or they just reflect the particularities of the family-migration 
trajectories and labour ‘quality’ of some origin groups in Spain, I re-estimated Model 3 
of Table 4 for five separated sub-sample of immigrant women from Morocco, Romania, 
Ecuador, Colombia and Other non-EU countries. Due to sample size’s constraints (see 
Table 5), some values of the original independent variables were merged into the same 
category for these new estimations (see in Table 6: potential and actual reunifiers, 
potential and actual importers, reunified by native and married to a native in Spain, and 
temporary and permanent residence permit). 
 
----- Insert Table 5 here ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Overall, we find fewer significant effects partially because of smaller samples. 
However, women who preceded their husband in migration to Spain (actual and 
potential reunifiers) are clearly more likely to be employed than women in the reference 
category (married in Spain to another immigrant) among Moroccans, Romanians and 
Others; for Ecuadorians and Colombians we find the expected positive sign but 
coefficients are not statistically significant. Moreover, reunified wives appear again 
more likely to be employed than women who married in Spain to another immigrant 
among both Moroccans and Romanians, the two largest groups in Spain, and the 
coefficient is almost significant for Colombians too. 
 
In contrast, the positive effect of joint couple migration seems to be just a ‘Romanian 
effect’. And contrary to our expectations, the negative effect associated with being an 
imported wife is not a Moroccan effect (see the non-significant coefficient in the first 
column); in fact, the coefficient for this category is only significant and negative for 
Ecuadorians and Others. 
 
Finally, marrying a native does not seem to have a consistent effect across groups: while 
Moroccan women who mix-marry are substantially more likely to be employed than the 
reference group, Ecuadorian women in mixed couples are substantially less likely to 
work than the reference category. These sharp differences suggest that selectivity into 
mixed marriages is a complex issue that to be correctly understood requires a thorough 
analysis of the characteristics not only of the immigrant partner but also the native ones, 
which is beyond the purpose of this article. 
 
 
7. Concluding remarks 
 
The obtained results confirm the theoretical and empirical utility of studying marriage 
and migration jointly in order to explain differences in the labour performance of 
immigrant women. On the one hand, the previous analyses seriously challenged the 
stereotypical image of economically inactive reunified wives.. On the other 
Finally, it is important to highlight that our main results concerning cross-types 
differences in female labour behaviour remained valid ever after controlling for current 
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legal status and legal status at entry, or after splitting the sample according to the 
country of origin of immigrant women. 
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Table 1.  Combined migration and family trajectories of non-EU immigrants aged 16-55 and who arrived at 16 or older, by gender (column %) 
  Marriage- Migration 
Sequence 
Spouses' location at 
survey 
Definition 
Males Females 
Potential reunifier 
Marriage took place 
before migration to 
Spain of both spouses 
Only first mover in Spain 
first-mover migrants who were married before migrating and 
did not live yet with their spouse in Spain  
6 
(234) 
3 
(184) 
Reunifier 
both in Spain 
first-mover migrants who were married before migrating and 
lived with their spouse in Spain at the time of the survey 
7 
(299) 
2 
(80) 
Reunified 
both in Spain 
second-mover migrants who were married before migrating 
and lived with their spouse in Spain at the time of the survey 
1 
(63) 
8 
(390) 
Joint couple migration 
both in Spain 
migrants married before migration and who migrated to Spain 
the same year as their spouses 
13 
(466) 
13 
(519) 
Potential importer 
Marriage took place 
after the migration to 
Spain of the first-mover 
spouse 
Only first mover in Spain 
first-mover migrant in couples that lived together in Spain at 
the time of the survey but had married after the migration to 
Spain of the  first-mover 
4 
(168) 
1 
(64) 
Importer 
both in Spain 
first-mover migrant in couples that lived together in Spain at 
the time of the survey but had married after the migration to 
Spain of the  first-mover 
5 
(199) 
1 
(35) 
Imported 
both in Spain 
second-mover migrant in couples that lived together in Spain 
at the time of the survey but had married after the migration to 
Spain of the  first-mover 
1 
(35) 
5 
(241) 
Reunified by native Marriage took place 
before the immigrant 
spouse came to Spain 
both in Spain migrant who married a Spanish-born before migrating to Spain 1 
(87) 
3 
(220) 
Married in Spain to other 
immigrant Marriage took place 
after migration to Spain  
both in Spain  
6 
(249) 
7 
(325) 
Married in Spain to a native 
both in Spain  5 
(285) 
8 
(593) 
Not married yet 
Non applicable Non Applicable  
42 
(1656) 
35 
(1602) 
Others (separated, divorced, etc.) 
   
9 
(381) 
12 
(635) 
Total 
N 
 
  
100 
(4,122) 
(100) 
(4,888) 
Source: NIS 2007 (INE). Weighted data. Number of observations in brackets.
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Figure 1.  Non-EU foreigners living in Spain 2000-2007 
 
Source: Municipal Population Register and Residence Permit Statistics, several years. Own elaboration 
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Table 2. Responses to the question ‘Why did you migrate to Spain?’ (multi-response possible). Non-EU immigrants aged 16-55 and who arrived at 16 or older, by 
gender and family-type (row %). 
 
 Economic Family Both Others 
 Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female 
Potential reunifier 81 74 3 5 4 9 12 12 
Reunifier 88 74 0 4 3 13 9 10 
Reunified 45 15 21 47 33 33 1 5 
Joint couple migration 65 51 4 11 7 17 24 21 
Potential importer 70 67 2 15 6 3 22 15 
Importer 71 42 4 31 8 6 17 21 
Imported 32 8 42 78 25 10 1 4 
Reunified by native 8 9 38 58 7 6 46 26 
Married to other immigrant 
in Spain 66 47 5 22 6 12 23 20 
Married to native in Spain 32 42 14 16 3 5 51 37 
Not married yet 60 51 15 16 10 10 16 22 
Others 73 56 5 16 5 8 17 20 
         
Total 64 45 10 22 8 12 19 20 
Source: NIS 2007 (INE). Weighted data. Number of observations in brackets
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Table 3.  Legal status (current and at entry) of non-EU immigrants aged 16-55 and who arrived at 
16 or older, by gender (column %) 
 Males Females 
Current Legal Status   
Undocumented 18 
(563) 
19 
(813) 
Temporary RP 43 
(1,765) 
40 
(1,960) 
Permanent RP 19 
(914) 
16 
(813) 
EU Card 5 
(214) 
7 
(388) 
Naturalised 11 
(509) 
14 
(7359 
Others 4 
(157) 
5 
(179) 
 100 100 
Legal Status at entry   
Irregular 23 
(781) 
28 
(1,172) 
Regular 16 
(697) 
18 
(952) 
Unknown 61 
(2,6449 
54 
(2,764) 
 100 
(4,122) 
100 
(4,888) 
Source: NIS 2007 (INE). Weighted data. Number of observations in brackets
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Table 4.  Estimates of Employment Probability of Non-EU Immigrants aged 16-55 and who arrived 
at 16 or older, by gender (logit regression) 
 Females Males 
 1 2 3  
Ref. Economic reasons to migrate     
Family reasons -0.78
***
 -0.78
***
 -0.75
***
 -0.72
***
 
 (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.15) 
Both (ec. and family) -0.14 -0.15 -0.16 -0.28 
 (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.16) 
Others -0.51
***
 -0.49
***
 -0.48
***
 -0.42
***
 
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.12) 
Ref. Married to immigrant in 
Spain 
    
Potential reunifier 1.70
***
 1.69
***
 1.66
***
 0.36 
  (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.28) 
Reunifier 1.01
**
 1.01
**
 1.02
**
 0.22 
  (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.27) 
Reunified 0.72
***
 0.68
***
 0.50
**
 -0.27 
  (0.18) (0.18) (0.19) (0.40) 
Joint couple migration 0.55
***
 0.56
***
 0.31 0.39 
  (0.16) (0.16) (0.19) (0.27) 
Potential importer 0.62 0.63 0.65
*
 -0.00 
  (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.28) 
Importer 1.18
**
 1.19
**
 1.18
**
 0.31 
  (0.42) (0.41) (0.41) (0.29) 
Imported -0.60
*
 -0.64
**
 -0.69
**
 0.25 
  (0.23) (0.24) (0.24) (0.47) 
Reunified by native -0.27 -0.19 0.06 0.49 
  (0.19) (0.20) (0.22) (0.38) 
Married to native in Sp. -0.10 -0.00 0.01 -0.05 
  (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.26) 
Not married yet 0.56
***
 0.56
***
 0.57
***
 0.07 
  (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.21) 
Others 0.85
***
 0.85
***
 0.85
***
 -0.14 
 (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.23) 
Ref. Undocumented     
Temporary RP  0.29
**
 0.59
***
 0.92
***
 
   (0.11) (0.13) (0.17) 
Permanent RP  0.04 0.39
*
 0.90
***
 
   (0.14) (0.16) (0.21) 
EU Card (EU relative)  -0.20 0.10 0.40 
   (0.16) (0.17) (0.25) 
Naturalised  0.07 0.36
*
 0.89
***
 
   (0.15) (0.17) (0.23) 
Others  -0.27 0.02 0.49 
   (0.19) (0.20) (0.26) 
Ref. Irregular Entry     
Legal entry   -0.64
***
 -0.29 
    (0.15) (0.21) 
Missing   -0.34
*
 0.03 
   (0.13) (0.19) 
Constant -0.58
*
 -0.59
*
 -0.41 -0.91
**
 
 (0.26) (0.27) (0.28) (0.34) 
Log. likelihood 
N 
-2733 
4888 
-2722 
4888 
-2713 
4888 
-1730 
4122 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001 
Controls for age at migration, years since migration, educational attainment, country of birth, Spanish 
fluency, ever worked before migration, job proposal before coming to Spain and number of children 
(results not shown here but available on request)
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Table 5.  Combined migration and family trajectories of female non-EU immigrants aged 16-55 and 
who arrived at 16 or older, by country of origin (column %) 
 Morocco Romania Ecuador Colombia Others 
Potential reunifier 1 
(7) 
2 
(28) 
3 
(29) 
2 
(12) 
4 
(108) 
Reunifier 1 
(3) 
2 
(12) 
4 
(18) 
2 
(8) 
2 
(39) 
Reunified 17 
(88) 
14 
(84) 
8 
(54) 
3 
(20) 
6 
(144) 
Joint couple migration 3 
(14) 
23 
(136) 
10 
(58) 
8 
(35) 
15 
(276) 
Potential importer 1 
(7) 
0 
(4) 
0 
(3) 
2 
(12) 
2 
(38) 
Importer 5 
(22) 
0 
(1) 
0 
(3) 
1 
(2) 
0 
(7) 
Imported 27 
(155) 
1 
(5) 
1 
(9) 
2 
(10) 
3 
(62) 
Reunified by native 1 
(19) 
0 
(4) 
1 
(7) 
3 
(24) 
5 
(166) 
Married in Spain to other 
immigrant 
11 
(60) 
8 
(59) 
7 
(40) 
6 
(36) 
6 
(130) 
Married in Spain to a native 4 
(37) 
5 
(50) 
7 
(56) 
13 
(112) 
9 
(338) 
Not married yet 15 
(73) 
34 
(217) 
42 
(241) 
46 
(246) 
36 
(825) 
Others 12 
(80) 
10 
(76) 
17 
(101) 
11 
(65) 
12 
(313) 
Total 100 
(565) 
100 
(676) 
100 
(619) 
100 
(582) 
100 
(2446) 
Source: NIS 2007 (INE). Weighted data. Number of observations in brackets
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Table 5. Estimates of Employment Probability of Non-EU Immigrants aged 16-55 and who arrived 
at 16 or older, by country of origin (logit regression) 
 Morocco Romania Ecuador Colombia Others 
Ref. Economic reasons to 
migrate 
     
Family reasons -0.57+ -0.71
**
 -0.71
*
 -0.72
*
 -0.86
***
 
 (0.32) (0.27) (0.32) (0.30) (0.13) 
Both (ec. and family) -0.10 0.30 -0.13 -0.49 -0.33+ 
 (0.41) (0.27) (0.34) (0.35) (0.17) 
Others 0.02 -0.33 -0.71
*
 0.01 -0.66
***
 
 (0.38) (0.30) (0.29) (0.28) (0.12) 
Ref. Married to immigrant 
in Spain 
     
Potential or actual reunifier 1.86
*
 1.12
*
 0.42 1.13 1.55
***
 
  (0.82) (0.55) (0.63) (0.71) (0.33) 
Reunified 1.63
**
 1.15
*
 -0.63 1.23 0.16 
  (0.60) (0.47) (0.74) (0.83) (0.29) 
Joint couple migration 0.88 0.88
*
 -0.28 1.01 -0.17 
  (0.96) (0.42) (0.77) (0.81) (0.27) 
Potential or actual importer 1.84
**
 -0.31 N.E. 1.07 0.56 
  (0.56) (1.10)  (0.77) (0.41) 
Imported 0.51 -1.00 -1.55+ -0.83 -1.00
**
 
  (0.51) (1.24) (0.94) (0.89) (0.38) 
Married to native in Sp. or 
reunified by native 
2.12
***
 -0.24 -1.32
**
 0.58 -0.23 
  (0.53) (0.44) (0.50) (0.45) (0.22) 
Not married yet 2.07
***
 0.78
*
 -0.25 0.90
*
 0.26 
  (0.50) (0.34) (0.44) (0.40) (0.21) 
Others 2.39
***
 0.90
*
 -0.21 1.08
*
 0.61
*
 
 (0.50) (0.45) (0.48) (0.51) (0.24) 
Ref. Undocumented      
Residence Permit 
(temporary or permanent) 
0.59 0.63
*
 0.63 0.08 0.82
***
 
  (0.55) (0.28) (0.50) (0.61) (0.18) 
EU Card (EU relative) -1.13 0.87+ 0.34 -1.14+ 0.59
*
 
  (0.79) (0.50) (0.61) (0.67) (0.23) 
Naturalised 0.60 0.81 0.71 -0.03 0.46
*
 
  (0.70) (0.92) (0.62) (0.67) (0.22) 
Others  -1.61+ 0.82 -1.92+ 0.54
*
 
   (0.83) (2.20) (0.99) (0.24) 
Ref. Irregular Entry      
Legal entry -0.78 -0.01 -0.79 -0.48 -0.86
***
 
  (0.58) (0.44) (0.66) (0.68) (0.19) 
Missing -0.45 0.12 -0.60 0.49 -0.56
**
 
 (0.52) (0.28) (0.59) (0.65) (0.18) 
Constant -1.26 -1.38+ -1.52 -1.16 0.52 
 (0.93) (0.74) (1.12) (1.05) (0.38) 
Log. Likelihood 
N 
-254 
565 
-371 
676 
-299 
613 
-309 
582 
-1408 
2435 
+ 
p < 0.10 
*
 p < 0.05, 
**
 p < 0.01, 
***
 p < 0.001. N.e.= not estimated due to insufficient cases 
Controls for age at migration, years since migration, educational attainment, country of birth, Spanish 
fluency, ever worked before migration, job proposal before coming to Spain and number of children 
(results not shown here but available on request) 
